In this note, we extend the Goyal and Joshi's model of network of collaboration in oligopoly to multi-market situations. We examine the incentive of firms to form links and the architectures of the resulting equilibrium networks in this setting. We also present some results on efficient networks.
these questions for situations in which firms compete on a oligopoly market. Collaborative links between firms lower marginal costs. However these links are costly and the costs are fixed and uniform across links. Westbrock (2010) investigates efficient networks in this setting albeit with differentiated products. Certain architectures emerge as candidates for stable and efficient networks. In the case that has maximum relevance for us, namely quantity competition in a homogeneous oligopoly with small costs of link formation, the complete network is both stable and efficient. In more general settings, stars, interlinked stars and dominant group architectures emerges as candidates for stable and efficient networks. Now competition between firms in few markets is a prominent feature of modern economies. In a seminal paper, Bulow et al. (1985) show how the introduction of multimarket competition can produce quite unexpected findings compare to standard results in industrial organization. We can then ask what happens to equilibrium and efficient networks when we introduce multimarket competition in the GJ's model of formation of collaborative networks.
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This paper gives a first insight at this question. We assume for purposes of simplicity heterogeneous product markets, with linear demand curves and quadratic cost functions, where multimarket competitors can form quality products enhancing collaborative links on one market. Our paper is different from the two earlier papers that follows the framework introduced by Bloch (1995) in the sense that links reduce marginal costs.
We follow the line of reasoning laid down by Chakrabarti and Haller (2011) . In that paper, firm can make costly investments that increase its demand and reduce the demand of other firms. These investments are interpreted as negative advertising. Here, investments increase the demand of both firms making the investment and interpreted as collaborative R&D activity. These investments take the form of costly links where the link increases the demand of both firms forming the link by a fixed amount. We restrict ourselves to quantity competition and use a similar demand function to that of Singh and Vives (1984) , Westbrock (2010) and Chakrabarti and Haller (2011) .
Our findings concerning equilibrium networks are quite similar to those of GJ (2003) , that is equilibrium networks have still a dominant group architecture, i.e. a group of firms are linked to each other while other firms have no links at all. We show that this result follows from the fact that our collaborative multimarket game qualifies as playing the field games (Goyal and Joshi, 2006) , with payoff function satisfying convexity in own links as well as the strategic substitutes property with regard to quantities. However, using Bulow et al. (1985) analysis, we show that contrary to the model of GJ (2003) With regard to efficient networks, though we cannot arrive at a precise characterization of these networks, we can derive some interesting properties of such networks and restrict the set of networks that are efficient into a small group. More precisely, efficient networks have only one component (or one group). Moreover in an efficient network the diameter of the component is very low, since the geodesic distance between two connected firms in the component cannot exceed two. Besides it turns out that equilibrium and efficient networks do not coincide. Our efficiency results are similar to Westbrock (2010) . The total surplus is convex in links provided that linking firm's subsequent partner is as well endowed in links as its previous partner. But we could not prove certain other properties which precluded a precise characterization.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 introduces the model and discusses the notation and terminology. Section 3 examines equilibrium networks, while Sections 4 deals with efficient networks. Section 5 concludes.
Framework 2.1 The Multi-market Cournot Model
Suppose there are n firms indexed by i = 1, 2, . . . , n (where n ≥ 3) that competeà la Cournot in two inter-related markets A and B. The set of all firms is denoted by N .
We denote by q i and Q i the quantities sold by firm i on markets A and B respectively, and by p i and P i the prices of firm i's products on these markets. Focusing on the most interesting case, we assume that competitors' products are strategic substitutes and there are diseconomies of scope across markets. More specifically, demand in markets A 4 and B for firm i are respectively given by
The cost function of a firm i is given by
Quality Improving Links and Collaborative Networks
Assume that firms can improve the quality of their products via collaborative links in only market 1. More specifically, we suppose that for each firm i ∈ N we have
where η i is the number of links formed by firm i. Link formation is costly and the cost of forming each link is given by c ≥ 0 and is incurred by both firms forming the link.
A collaborative network g is a list of pairs of firms who are linked to each other. For simplicity, we denote the link between i and j (where i = j) by ij. So ij ∈ g indicates i and j are linked in the network g. A network g is a formal descriptions of the pairwise collaborative links that exist between firms. Let G denote the set of all networks. We let g + ij denote the network formed by adding the link ij to the network g, g − ij denote the network formed by deleting the link ij from the network g.
A firm i's neighborhood N i (g) is given by {j ∈ N \{i}|ij ∈ g} and its cardinality is given by
links in which firm i is involved. Let λ(g) = 1 2 i∈N η i (g) be the total number of links in a network g. For any h ⊂ g, let g − h denotes the network formed by deleting the set of links h from the network g. Similarly, for h ⊂ g N \g, g + h denotes the network formed 5 by adding the links set h to the network g. Moreover we define g −i as the resulting network once we remove all firm i's links from the network g.
A path in g connecting i and j is a set of distinct firms {i 1 , i 2 , . . . , i p } ⊂ N with p ≥ 2
We say i and j are connected to each other if a path exists between them and they are disconnected otherwise. Given a network g, we define a component as a set C(g) ⊂ N such that for all i, j ∈ C(g) there exists a path between i and j and there does not exist a path between a player i ∈ C(g) and a player j ∈ C(g). 
Equilibrium and Efficient Networks
A network is a pairwise equilibrium network if
, and
For any network g, and h ⊂ g N \g, we denote the marginal benefit of link formation by
Next, we define efficient networks. Let CS be consumers' surplus function and Π be firms' aggregate profits function. The welfare function W is given by:
A network g is an efficient network if g maximizes the welfare function, that is W (g ) ≥ W (g) for all g = g . We say that g is efficient for firms (consumers) if it maximizes the aggregate profits of firms (surplus of consumers). For any network g, and h ⊂ g N \g, we denote the marginal change in welfare and total profits resulting from link formation by
Characterization of Equilibrium Networks
Although the payoff functions are quite complicated, this game has features similar to the game analyzed by Goyal and Joshi (2006) . Hence we will invoke their results here.
Definition 1 A network game is called playing the field game if the payoff function of
firm i is a function of her degree, η i (g), and the total number of links in g −i , λ (g −i ):
Definition 2 The payoff function Φ is convex in its own links if the marginal returns
Definition 3 Suppose l > l. The payoff function Φ satisfies the strategic substitutes
It is easy to check that the collaborative multimarket game qualifies as playing the field game. Furthermore, the payoff function satisfies convexity in own links as well as the strategic substitutes property. In fact, if we define
then we have ∂∆Φ ∂k = 2γ 2 11n 4 + 44n 3 − 6n 2 − 100n + 83
Therefore, we get from GJ (2006, p.327, Proposition 3.1) the following corollary.
Corollary 1
The pairwise equilibrium network is either complete or empty or has a dominant group architecture. Proof The proof of (i) and (ii) is straightforward since the expression of consumers' surplus function is given by
The following lemma considers a network g in which links ik and im do not exist, while firm m has formed at least as many links as firm k in g. It shows that if total profits of firms increase when the link ik is added to the network g, then total profits also increases when the link im is adding to the network g + ik and this increase is of a greater magnitude (the proof is in appendix).
Lemma 2 For any network g and firms
The following proposition results from Lemmas 1 and 2 (the proof is in appendix).
Proposition 1 For any network g and firm i such that ik, im / ∈ g and η m (g) ≥ η k (g),
we have ∆W (g + ik, im) > ∆W (g, ik)
1 Goyal and Joshi (2003) do no provide efficiency results for the one market case stating that this is a hard problem.
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Proposition 1 has the following corollary.
Corollary 2 For any efficient network g, if ij ∈ g and ik / ∈ g, then η j (g) > η k (g).
Proof Suppose there exists an efficient network g and ij ∈ g and ik / ∈ g. Then,
. This implies by Proposition 1 that ∆W (g, ik) > 0 contradicting that g is efficient. Hence, for all k such
There is an interesting effect behind this result. Let a network g and firms i, k, m ∈ N such that ik ∈ g and im / ∈ g. Suppose that we substitute the link im to the link ik in g.
It is obvious from Lemma 1 (i) that consumer surplus does not change. In other words the variation of consumers surplus is the same when we go from the network g −ik to the network g as when we go from the network g − ik to the network g − ik + im. However it is easy to check that the variation of the total profits is higher in the latter case than in the first case. In other words, regarding total profits, the more numerous links a firm i has formed, the better it is that a firm j which is not linked to i substitutes the link with i to one of its links. To sum up, from an efficiency point of view, there is a strength acting toward some kind of concentration of links which plays an important role in the result of Corollary 2.
The proposition below sets forth properties that characterize efficient networks.
Proposition 2 (i) An efficient network has at most one component.
(ii) The geodesic distance between any two connected firms in an efficient network is at most 2.
Proof (i) Suppose h 1 , h 2 ∈ C(g) where g is an efficient network and ij ∈ h 1 and kl ∈ h 2 . Now, i is linked to j and not to k which implies using Corollary 2, η j (g) > η k (g). But l is linked to k but not to j which implies η k (g) > η j (g). Hence, we arrive at a contradiction.
(ii) Take two firms i and j such that i and j belong to N (h) where h ∈ C(g). Hence, a path exists between i and j. Suppose the shortest path is {i 1 i 2 , i 2 i 3 , . . . , i p−1 i p } where i 1 = i and i p = j and p ≥ 4. i 1 is linked to i 2 but i 1 is not linked to i 3 , i 4 is linked to i 3 but i 4 is not linked to i 2 . Hence, from Corollary 2, we get both η i 2 (g) > η i 3 (g) and Example 1 let n = 4, β i = 400 for all i ∈ N , γ 0 = 100, γ = 45 and c = 0. We can check that the pairwise equilibrium networks are the networks where there is only one link and the networks where there is a complete component with three firms and an isolated firm, while the unique efficient network is the complete network.
Conclusion
The dynamics of multi-market oligopolies first discussed in Bulow et al. (1985) can upset many results which would hold in isolated oligopoly markets. Here we take the situation of collaborative link formation among Cournot oligopolists. The result that a complete network materializes in equilibrium when costs of links are null, no longer holds once we introduce multimarket competition. With positive link formation costs, efficient 11 networks have the very interesting feature that they consist of only one component with a very low diameter.
Proof of Proposition 1. Suppose a network g and firms i, k, m ∈ N such that ik, im / ∈ g and η m (g) ≥ η k (g). We know from Lemma 2, that we have ∆Π(g + ik, im) κ > ∆Π(g, ik) κ , with κ . Besides we know that the consumers' surplus function is convex (see Lemma 1), so we have ∆CS(g + ik, im) κ > ∆CS(g, ik) κ .
Since the welfare function is defined as W = Π + CS and the convexity property is preserved under addition of two convex functions, we then have ∆W (g + ik, im) κ > ∆W (g, ik) κ , completing the proof.
